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Jimmy Breslin, the Pulitzer Prize winning author, once said of the American presidency 
that it is a “bastardized thing, half royalty and half democracy.” The presidency that emerged 
from the Constitutional Convention was specifically designed to be an executive office capable 
of protecting the state and the Constitution, capable of checking the powers of the legislature and 
judiciary, and at the same time face checks to its own power that prevent the office from 
usurping unwarranted authority or becoming a tyranny. While the presidency is a limited 
executive, the nature of the office, in particular its role as Commander-in-Chief, allow it 
extraordinary flexibility in increasing its power. The framers of the Constitution deserve to be 
lauded for their foresight; no man to ever hold the office has been able to establish a tyranny or 
transform the United States into an authoritarian state. Nevertheless, the office of the presidency 
today would seem remarkably different to the framers than their design intended. During the 20th 
century the American presidency underwent a period of expansion in terms of both its 
political/governing power and the public’s concept of its proper role. Especially in regards to the 
conduct of foreign affairs and military operations, the Commander-in-Chief now enjoys powers 
that would make statesmen tremble during the early years of the American republic. This 
imperial presidency is not an absolute monarchy, nor is it a dictatorship. Instead, the imperial 
presidency is an appropriation by the executive of powers reserved by the Constitution and 
historical practice to Congress, receiving its impetus to do so from foreign policy and war-
making power.1 
What circumstances and events cultivated such a growth in presidential power, and what 
have been its enduring effects on American foreign relations? Two major factors shaped the 
emergence of the modern “imperial” presidency. The first is the success of the FDR presidency 
in demonstrating the potential of active and energetic administration and in undergoing an 
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extensive expansion of the federal government around the executive. The second factor is the 
emergence of the United States as a superpower following World War II and its role as the 
champion of the capitalist world during the Cold War. These factors combined helped create the 
imperial presidency, which enjoys enhanced prestige and authority over the federal government, 
and which in regards to foreign policy has been marked by an expansion of executive war power 
and unilateral, interventionist actions across the globe in pursuit of national security and 
economic interests. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt revolutionized both the office of the presidency and the 
scope and size of the federal government. Roosevelt’s tenure in office heightened the American 
public’s expectations of how active an administration should be and broadened the public’s 
notions of the legitimate role of the federal government. Facing the crisis of the Great 
Depression, Roosevelt was able to repudiate the governing commitments of the previous 
Republican-dominated regime. During these years the office was transformed as the president 
became a major political actor in the legislative process, a role not associated previously with the 
office. With extensive warrants for his presidential authority, FDR was able to wield the 
disruptive powers of the office in such a way as to create a new governing coalition and 
transform the federal governments’ commitments to the American people. The transformation of 
the federal government occurred largely through the New Deal and through the creation of the 
Executive Office of the President. The New Deal created new institutions and extended services 
to organized labor, small businesses, the poor, the unemployed and the elderly. These types of 
reform permanently changed the dynamics of what American citizens expect their federal 
government to provide for them. In order to meet and manage the administrative demands 
brought about by this expansion of federal oversight, the “President needs help” as the 
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Brownlow Committee of 1936 wrote in its famous report on administrative management.2 This 
report led to the establishment of the Executive Office of the President, which gave the 
presidency “new authority to control the vastly expanded federal bureaucracy and for new 
executive offices to provide planning and direction for governmental operations.”3 These 
reconstructions of the federal government and its commitments were centered on an expanded 
executive branch and thus increased the president’s authority in domestic affairs and in 
managing the various executive agencies and departments.  
As stated earlier the structural, institutional side of the presidency was not the only aspect 
of the office to be revolutionized during FDR’s administration, President Roosevelt was equally 
successful in a rhetorical modernization of the presidency. Roosevelt ran for office during a 
Great Depression that had exposed the vulnerability of the established governing coalition. This 
gave Roosevelt tremendous authority for repudiation and thus as president allowed him to enjoy 
tremendous public prestige. FDR altered the dynamic of the president’s rhetorical role by 
communicating directly with the American public on matters of policy and legislation. Similar 
strategies had been employed before by presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow 
Wilson, but never on the grand-scale of FDR, who had the advantage of being able to utilize the 
newly developed radio in his famous “Fireside chats” with American citizens. Following the 
FDR years, the American people expected their presidents to be active in communicating policy 
matters to the public and to take the lead in pushing for new legislation. The President as 
legislator is a role of the office that marks a departure from 19th century presidents. Essentially, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s extraordinary term in office (he is the only president elected 
more than twice) witnessed a decisive revolution within the federal government. After his term 
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in office not only was the federal government’s governing role expanded vastly, but within the 
federal government itself the balance of power was shifted decisively towards the executive 
branch. This executive branch was itself enlarged on an unprecedented scale and was brought 
increasingly under the control of the presidency. 
The year is now 1945. The United States has just undergone a transformative period in its 
history. First, the federal government and its governing commitments were enlarged on an 
unprecedented scale. Next, in order to meet the administrative demands created by the expansion 
of the role of the federal government, the executive branch was expanded and the president 
granted increased authority to manage the various agencies. Additionally, the United States and 
its allies emerged victorious from World War II, which leaves the United States and the Soviet 
Union as the world’s only two superpowers. Previously in its history the United States was 
traditionally isolationist and evasive of international affairs, especially those regarding Europe. 
After World War II, the United States stands as the world’s leading industrial and military power 
– an unprecedented and unforeseen role for the democratic republic. The government of the 
United States is now able to determine events in other continents and other corners of the glove. 
The context of the Cold War is alarming the U.S. government which sees a growing international 
Communist menace, led by the Soviet Union, which has already conquered China and is 
threatening to swallow up the rest of continental Europe, Korea, and other regions such as 
Southeast Asia and Latin America. As the only democratic and capitalist superpower on the 
planet, the U.S., whether it wills it or not, finds itself placed into the role of defender of the free 
or capitalist world. This Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union means that 
America needs to be prepared to have a rapid military response against threats to her national 
security and economic interests around the world. Even the casual reader can foresee what this 
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means for the government of the United States. The Great Depression and World War II already 
enhanced the powers of the presidency and what the public deemed its proper governing role. 
Now, without a pause the United States transitions from the Depression-WWII era into the Cold 
War era. Given the aforementioned context of a tenuous, hostile relationship between the USSR 
and the U.S. in which a war could break out over seemingly any international disagreement, it is 
not difficult to foresee the U.S. presidency taking the helm in setting foreign policy during the 
Cold War years.  
The implications and consequences of the Cold War for the American presidency are far-
reaching and just as transformative as the events of the Great Depression. Whereas the 
Depression had served as a catalyst for enhancing the president’s public prestige and domestic 
governing role, the Cold War will enhance the president’s authority in foreign policy and serve 
as a catalyst for executive usurpation of increased war powers. Time and again throughout the 
Cold War the United States will face serious conflicts with the communist world camp and will 
respond with decisive, unilateral action to either defeat the Communist “enemies” or to at least 
force them to stand down. Politically and constitutionally the U.S. presidency will manipulate 
such events to its advantage, using the rhetoric of foreign crises to justify quick executive 
response through either outright military intervention or covert, clandestine operations. As a 
result, the presidency will emerge from the long years of the Cold War with a nearly established 
precedent for unilateral military action in the face of foreign crises which only the president, as 
Commander-in-Chief has the capacity to respond to quickly and effectively. 
The United States Constitution empowers only the US Congress with the power to 
declare a state of war. On the other hand, the Constitution declares that the president is the 
Commander-in-Chief of armed forces. Therefore, when a state of war exists, the presidency has 
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extraordinary wartime powers. What happens, however, if Congress does not have time to 
deliberate and declare war, or if the country is preemptively attacked? This is the loophole 
through which the Commander-in-chief increases his power throughout the Cold War. The Cold 
War presented the United States with unique challenges to the conduct of military conflicts. The 
United States has not declared a state of war since World War II, yet still the U.S. has been 
involved in numerous “wars” since then: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and a 
number of smaller interventions around the world. How is this possible? It is possible because 
beginning with the Korean War, the U.S. presidency began to establish a precedent of unilateral 
action, largely bypassing Congress, to conduct military operations that are not wars, but are yet 
still justified as necessary defenses of America’s interests. 
The unparalleled problems for foreign policy during the Cold War created a “menace of 
unexpected crisis that hung over the world, demanding...the centralization of foreign policy in 
the Presidency.”4 On June 24, 1950 Communist North Korea invaded South Korea, a nation 
supported by the United States and its allies. Initially, President Truman made no commitment of 
U.S. military forces, although both America and the United Nations had resolved to order a 
withdrawal of North Korean forces. However, on June 27, 1950, the United Nations 
recommended that member-states militarily assist South Korea. Truman then announced that “in 
these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the [South] Korean 
government troops cover and support.”5 Truman’s legal authority to act this way is nonexistent 
for two reasons. First, Truman argued that the conflict in Korea was not a war, and that the 
United States was pursuing a police action under the United Nations. However, the United 
Nations exercised no real control over the conduct of the war and apart from token assistance 
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provided by a few nations the ground war was conducted entirely by American troops. Second, 
Truman did not seek Congressional approval for the military operations in Korea. Even if it was 
to be agreed that the Korean conflict was not a war, then under the UN Participation Act 
President Truman still required Congressional approval for special agreements that involved the 
commitment of American troops to combat operations. Under the UN Participation Act the 
president could only commit troops without Congressional approval if they served in a strictly 
noncombatant capacity.6 In committing U.S. troops to the Korean War, Truman had violated the 
commands of the Constitution and of a congressional statute.  
Certainly, one would assume that once the war was over, a vengeful Congress would 
reassert its constitutional role. This however, never occurred, Congress responded with 
acquiescence and hardly a whimper of protest.7 The Korean War contributed to the growing 
sentiment that the world was greatly endangered by the spread of the Communist bloc, and the 
crisis mood that the nation was in put a strain on the conduct of foreign policy in regards to the 
separation of powers in the federal government. From the 1950s on during the Cold War 
American foreign policy demanded that the American government do things no previous 
American government had done in terms of overseas interventions under the auspices of the 
executive branch.8 
The decades of the Cold War demonstrate the imperial presidency at its height. In the 
years following the Korean War the best example of aggressive American foreign policy is the 
Vietnam War, and this undeclared war is similarly carried out under the auspices of unilateral 
presidential authority. American troops had been present in South Vietnam since the Eisenhower 
administration in a purely advisory role. Again, the context of the Cold War justified the 
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American presence as a necessary safeguard against a possible Communist takeover in Southeast 
Asia at the hands of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong.  President Kennedy increased the 
number of troops from 700 to 16,000. When President Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the 
presidency, he was determined to escalate the conflict in Vietnam. According to the Johnson 
administration, on August 2, 1964 North Vietnamese gunboats attacked a U.S. destroyer in the 
Gulf of Tonkin.9 President Johnson ordered the navy to take retaliatory measures, and then again, 
according to the administration, on August 4 a second attack occurred on two U.S. destroyers. 
That night Johnson appeared on television, announcing to the American public that he had 
ordered the navy to take retaliatory action and that the U.S. response would be “limited and 
fitting,” and also that he “intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war.”10 Two days later, on 
August 6, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The resolution essentially gave 
Lyndon Johnson a blank check to wage a presidential war, approving and supporting “the 
determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel 
any armed attack against the forces of the United States.”  The resolution was to expire when 
“the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured.”11 
Through this sweeping language the US Congress essentially surrendered its war power to the 
executive, allowing President Johnson to escalate the conflict in Vietnam at his discretion. By 
December 1965 the US troop deployment to Vietnam increased to 200,000 men. Johnson later 
said of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that it was “like grandma’s nightgown; it covered 
everything.”12 
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 The resolution was a political success for the administration and it did grant them a free 
hand in turning up the heat of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Subsequent investigations of the 
Gulf of Tonkin crisis cast a heavy shadow over the Johnson administration and its expansion of 
executive war power. Certainly the first attack that occurred on August 2 by a lone North 
Vietnamese gunboat on one U.S. navy destroyer was far too minor of an incident to justify a 
Congressional resolution granting the president wide ranging powers to mobilize for military 
action. Additionally, the second alleged attack on August 4 probably never happened – 
conflicting accounts of the action have been given and the ship’s radar gives only inconclusive 
evidence.13 Regardless of what truly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin, the “crisis” still had the 
same effect – the American military machine was committed to an undeclared but growing war 
in Indochina, and the war’s direction was to be determined by the presidency. 
A notable characteristic of the imperial or Cold War-era presidency is its interventionist 
foreign policy. Such aggressive foreign policy directed by the presidency has already been 
described in the accounts of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Large-scale ground wars are not the 
only examples of American Cold War interventions, however. During this era the United States 
extensively used covert means to wage war against the Soviet Union and its perceived 
sympathizers. Through clandestine operations waging from the supplying of insurgents to the 
outright ousting of regimes in third-world countries, American muscle and economic power were 
applied with finesse. Two textbook examples of such U.S. instigated coup d’états include the 
1953 Iranian and 1954 Guatemalan coups, both of which were carried out during the Eisenhower 
administration and largely executed by the CIA. Both coups were decided necessary because the 
governments of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran and President Arbenz of Guatemala were 
deemed to be socialist and potential Soviet allies, despite being democratically elected 
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governments. President Eisenhower was not shy in utilizing covert operations as a means of 
combating the Soviet Union around the world.14 In the case of Iran, the Eisenhower 
administration was primarily motivated by concern over the security of Iranian oil assets. 
Mossadegh was planning to nationalize Iranian oil, and the U.S. and Great Britain began to plan 
his to oust him from power. The Shah of Iran was returned to his country by the CIA after a short 
exile, and Mossadegh was deposed, replaced, arrested and given a show trial. In the case of 
Guatemala, the U.S. intelligence community decided that Arbenz’s land reform programs were 
socialist in nature and suspected Soviet influence in his government. The CIA financed and 
armed rebel Guatemalan armies, finding a leader for them in the person of Colonel Carlos 
Armas. In June 1954 Armas’ forces invaded Guatemala, and supported by radio propaganda, 
successfully created an impression of insurmountable odds arrayed against Arbenz. By the end of 
June Arbenz had resigned. The success of these two coups encouraged the United States in 
further clandestine operations. Between 1951 and 1975 it is estimated that the CIA engaged in 
some nine hundred such interventions.15 
The Iranian and Guatemalan coups should be alarming for two major reasons. First, both 
regimes that were overthrown by U.S. pressure were democratically elected governments, 
whether or not the U.S. approved of their reform policies. Secondly, both operations were 
essentially presidential exercises in foreign regime change. In both cases, the executive branch 
operated without Congress in planning, organizing, and executing the removal and replacement 
of a foreign government. There is no constitutional basis for an American president having the 
authority to determine whether or not a foreign government is legitimate or has the right to be in 
power, and then follow up that determination by overthrowing that regime. This type of 
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aggressive action is the direct product of a foreign policy that is centralized in an executive 
branch which presides over the direction of a military superpower. 
The eventual failure of the Vietnam War and the high price it bore left a bad taste for 
military interventions in the mouths of the American public. Nevertheless, the Reagan 
administration was able to order an American invasion of Grenada in 1983 and air strikes against 
Libya in 1986. Eleven members of Congress went to court, claiming that Reagan had violated 
the Constitu65tion, but they lost when the issue was held to no longer be relevant as the invasion 
of Grenada had ended.16 The presidency of George H.W. Bush witnessed two exercises in 
carrying out splendid little presidential wars: the invasion of Panama in 1989-1990 and the Gulf 
War. When Congress was out of session in December 1989, President Bush ordered 11,000 
troops to Panama to link up with 13,000 troops already present in the Canal Zone. President 
Bush justified his action on the basis of the “imminent danger” to the American citizens present 
represented by General Manuel Noriega’s regime. Bush also cited other justifications such as 
defending democracy in Panama and combating drug trafficking. Noriega surrendered to the 
United States January 3, 1990. Then, on February 7 of the same year, the House of 
Representatives passed a resolution approving the president’s actions, declaring that he had acted 
“decisively and appropriately in ordering U.S. forces to intervene in Panama.”17 Such a token 
approval does not satisfy constitutional requirements; if thousands of American troops were 
ordered overseas by the President of the United States to invade a foreign nation and overthrow 
its sitting government it should only be following a prior Congressional declaration of war. 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The President Bush had a number 
of reasons for desiring a quick war against Iraq. First, Kuwait’s oil supply needed to be 
                                                          
16
 Fisher, Louis, Presidential War Power (Kansas: University Press of Kansas), 163. 
17
 Fisher, Louis, Presidential War Power (Kansas: University Press of Kansas), 166. 
McLain 13 
 
safeguarded for American interests. Second, a quick victory over Hussein would assumedly 
boost the president’s sagging political fortunes.18 President Bush’s administration refused to seek 
to try to seek authority from Congress, and instead sought to “authorize” its war by building an 
international coalition of allies including Saudi Arabia, France, and Britain, and through a UN 
resolution authorizing member states to “use all necessary means” to force Iraqi troops out of 
Kuwait. As Louis Fisher asks in his work Presidential War Power, “What role would Congress 
have?”19 There is another overarching explanation that helps lend insight into the context of the 
Gulf War. The Cold War ended in 1989, and the American “victory” in Panama strengthened 
advocates of Bush’s “new world order” that would, in its essentials, equate to a world with only 
the United States as the remaining superpower able to flex its military and economic muscle in 
promoting American interests around the world. America’s Cold War-era leadership made the 
Middle East its next target of imperialist ambition.20 Again, consistent with the Cold War-era, 
presidential leadership was argued to be most suitable for conducting the inevitable quick 
military interventions that policing the world would require. 
Thus far, this essay has primarily covered the following topics: the enhancement of 
presidential prestige and federal governing power during the FDR administration, and the Cold 
War-era expansion of presidential war power. The combined effects of these developments 
amount to what the author of this essay considers the imperial presidency. The main 
characteristic of the foreign policy has been the arbitrary use of American military might in 
interventionist adventures.21 Arguably, this Cold War-era leadership in foreign policy did not end 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union or the electoral defeat of George H.W. Bush in 1992. After 
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September 11, 2001, a sense of American vulnerability gave way to a 9/11 American mentality 
that was at the same time unique and reminiscent of the Cold War.22 The War on Terror was 
conducted on terms familiar to the United States which had survived World War II and the Cold 
War: the good guys (America) vs. the bad guys (Terror); black and white; good and evil. This 
mentality was equally suitable to the remnants of Cold War-era statesmen present in the 
administration of George W. Bush, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, all of whom were major 
architects in the second Bush’s second Iraq War.23 It should come as no surprise that Bush’s 
military response following the attacks of 9/11 did not come in the form of a Congressional 
declaration of war, but instead in the form of a “resolution” that, again, typical of the imperial 
presidency, authorized President Bush to use “all necessary action against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided” the 9/11 
terrorists.24 The resolution granted Bush remarkable authority to conduct the War on Terror and 
determine who counts as an enemy in that war. 
Schlesinger says of the Cold War-era presidency, “The imperial presidency was 
essentially the creation of foreign policy. A combination of doctrines and emotions – belief in 
permanent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and right of the United 
States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world – had brought about an unprecedented 
centralization of decisions over war and peace in the presidency.”25 This essay has briefly 
chronicled the development of the imperial presidency and its supremacy in the conduct of 
American foreign relations, but the discussion does not end there. While the rhetoric of the Cold 
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War and the War on Terror have justified in the name of democracy our country’s various 
exercises in interventionism in places such as Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and Iraq, these foreign 
escapades have actually often been conducted in the pursuit of less idealized interests such as 
geopolitical and economic concerns. A history of the imperial presidency and its foreign policy 
is most useful for exposing the flaws and abuses inherent in the centralization of power over war 
and peace in the hands of the president. Such a history will show that the U.S. Congress, instead 
of actively asserting its Constitutional prerogatives, has been largely submissive in allowing the 
presidency to appropriate increased war powers.26 
The current status and future of the imperial presidency are unclear. President George W. 
Bush and his administration continued to operate within its framework in the War on Terror and 
in the invasion of Iraq. With Bush’s departure from office, and the removal from power of the 
final generation of Cold War leadership that persisted in the Bush administration, there is hope 
that the Cold War-era imperialist presidency will give way to a presidential style more 
appropriate to the increasingly multilateral and shrinking world. Thus far, President Barack 
Obama’s foreign policy seems to be geared, at least in its rhetoric and diplomatic overtures, 
towards turning away from the United States’ arbitrary, interventionist past.  However, it is a 
certainty that both the people and politicians of the United States still perceive our nation as the 
world’s foremost superpower and share a nationalist desire to see America promote her interests 
and values on the global stage, making an abandonment of the imperial presidency and its costly 
interventionism much harder to accomplish. When will America decide to rid herself of the 
burden of empire? 
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